In this paper I look at the tax treatment of households under individual filings and characterise the efficiency properties of an income tax schedule that redistributes from rich to poor households. Because tax liabilities are determined on individual incomes but the decision to earn those incomes are made at the household level, the tax liable members of the same household can side trade leisure for net income with one another, and such side trade enables them to carry out tax arbitrage. I analyse the problem for a two class economy both with and without perfect assortative mating. The main conclusion is that the prevention of tax arbitrage imposes structure on the graduation of the tax schedule.
Introduction
Comparative tax studies for advanced economies (OECD: Messere, 1993, EU: O' Donoghue & Sutherland, 1999) show that many countries consider the individual as the tax unit. Most OECD countries apply this principle to some extent, and many recent tax reforms have substituted the family for the individual as the tax unit. What is the position of optimal income taxation theory in this respect? The standard model, as exposed by Mirrlees (1971) or Stiglitz (1982) , typically assumes that the agent who makes the decision to earn an income is also the one who bears the legal tax incidence. Thus, it is well suited to discuss the taxation of singles or the taxation of household income. But when labour earnings are the result of a household decision and taxed at the individual level, the standard model becomes deficient and needs amendment. In this paper, I take the principle of individual taxation as given, and ask how an income tax system should treat labour income when the earnings decisions are made by a small coalition of people, as in a household with two income earners. In particular, I characterise the efficiency properties of a redistributive income tax system that satisfies such a household incentive compatibility requirement.
Since my aim is not to carry out a comparative analysis of family taxation regimes (joint vs individual), I ignore differences in labour supply elasticities of different household members, or the possible divergences between social and household preferences for redistribution. 1 Rather, I want to focus on an incentive problem that has been left out of the discussion so far, namely the tax arbitrage possibilities that an individually based tax system may offer to households.
The mechanism through which such arbitrage can occur is simple: within the household, its members can exchange leisure for consumption (disposable income) by rescheduling duties in housework and by compensating each other for this. Such a side trade in leisure for money can easily be enforced by the presence of trust among the household members. When the government designs the tax schedule, it should take into account that people may engage 1 Boskin (1975) and Boskin & Sheshinski (1983) were the first to investigate the question whether the individual or the household is the apporpriate tax unit. They provide Ramsey-type arguments against the practice of income splitting where husband and wife face the same marginal tax rate: the higher wage elasticity of the secondary worker warrants a lower marginal tax rate. Apps & Rees (1988, 1997a, 1997b ) build on the BoskinSheshinki model by introducing redistributional concerns within and across households and by allowing for production within the household of a private household good. In all these models, the marginal income tax rate is taken constant across income levels, but possibly conditioned on gender. Munnell (1980) discusses the incongruence of three basic axioms (progressivity, horizontal equity and neutrality w.r.t. marriage) in tax design.
into this kind of arbitrage. Put differently, it should make the tax system household incentive compatible. I will argue that the household compatibility constraints, together with the skewness of the income distribution put structure on the graduation of the optimal marginal tax rate. To formalise my argument, I build on the standard income taxation model for a two-class economy as exposed by Stiglitz (1982) , and then amend this model to allow for the fact that within a household people can co-ordinate their labour market and homework decisions.
It is not so difficult to understand why such co-ordination needs to be taken into account. Consider a two-class economy and suppose that the government has designed an individually incentive compatible tax system, so that a high ability person prefers to earn a high rather than low income level and pay the corresponding tax. Now, suppose in addition that two high ability persons form a household. They could agree that one of them takes a part time job on the labour market, earning a low income level with a low tax liability, and that the other earns a high income level with a high tax liability. To the extent that the individual incentive compatibility constraint is slack, the low income earner will initially enjoy a lower utility level. But the fact that both agents have taken a different stance in the labour market makes their marginal rates of substitution between disposable income and leisure differ. The wider this difference, the larger the opportunities for mutually improving side trades. For sufficiently large side trading opportunities, both members earning a high income level (and paying high taxes) will turn out to be a dominated strategy.
There are two ways in which the government can contain side trade opportunities. One is to distort the labour supply of high ability agents downwards, i.e. to impose a positive marginal tax rate on high income levels. A second way is to make the initial welfare loss to a high ability person when earning a low income level sufficiently high, and this can be done by distorting low incomes downwards. The social cost of distorting a bundle is directly proportional to the number of people opting for it. The social benefit, on the other hand, is the reduction in informational rent and is proportional to the number of people that are discouraged from opting for the bundle. This means that the optimal size of the distortion depends on the number of people whose behaviour is distorted vs the number who are discouraged. And this relative number depends in turn on the direction of redistribution and the skewness of the ability distribution. That is why household incentive compatibility puts structure on the graduation of the income tax schedule.
The paper relates to the literature on taxation with side trade opportunities. In that literature, one is concerned with the design of a tax system when perfect side trading opportunities exist, either through multilateral coalition formation (Hammond, 1987) or by trading on perfectly competitive side markets (Guesnerie, 1995 , ch 1). 2 For both cases, it is shown that the only feasible tax systems that can be designed are linear ones. In an earlier paper (Schroyen, 1997), I characterised an efficient commodity tax system when side trading is limited to take place within bilateral coalitions and investigated how much better this system performs w.r.t. fully linear commodity taxation. The present paper focusses on income taxation and its relation to household production activities. It is organised as follows. In the next section, I describe the basic model. In section 3, I discuss the household incentive compatibility constraints and derive the Pareto efficient income tax schedule for a two class society with perfect assortative mating. The case of imperfect assortative mating is studied in section 4. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main assumptions.
The model
The framework that I use builds on the standard two-class model for optimal taxation, as exposed by Stiglitz (1982) . A large number of citizens populate the economy. A fraction µ L of them have a low productive ability w L , while the complementary fraction µ H (= 1 − µ L ) is endowed with a high productive ability w H (> w L ). All citizens dispose of a total time endowment equal to unity, and they all share the same utility function defined over private consumption (x), leisure (`) and a 'public' household commodity (h), u(x,`, h), which displays the standard properties of monotonicity and strict concavity. The private consumption good is a normal good that is produced with a linear production technology whose transformation coefficients for both types of labour are normalised to unity. If the consumption good is treated as the numéraire, the productive abilities of the citizens also represent their real wage rates. The household commodity cannot be bought on the market, but only produced at home by devoting household time. I assume that g hours spent on household production activity yields h(g) units of the household good, where h(·) is a concave production function measuring the tidiness of the house, the extent to which children are taken care off, etc.
Each citizen in this economy lives with one other citizen in a household. So there are no households with three or more members, and neither are there people living on their own. 3 In a first instance I assume perfect alignment of 2 In a recent paper, Agell & Persson (2000) describe the implications for labour supply decisions when workers can tax arbitrate via the asset market. That analysis takes the income tax schedule as given and does not derive any normative implications. 3 What is really necessary is that each household consists of two (and only two) pro-productive abilities, that is every household consists only of people belonging to the same ability class. In section 4, however, I will relax this assumption and show that the results go through with imperfect assortative mating. The decision process within each household takes place in a co-operative way. In particular, I use Samuelson's (1956) consensus model and assume that household partners maximise a utilitarian welfare function defined over their individual utilities. 4 Though there is a quickly emerging literature on non-co-operative bargaining within marriage (recently reviewed by Lundberg & Pollak, 1996) , I take the household as an institution where trust and reputation work sufficiently well to enforce agreements made by its members. I should hasten to add that the household partners need not be legally linked through marriage. They can be, but they can also be any pair of people willing to assume the shared responsibility for the production of household commodities, be it because they are in love with one another, or because they are good friends and agree to share accommodation. I also note here that the existence of households and their co-operative decision-making is taken as given. No attempt is made to explain why and how households form.
Let us now consider a household of type i (= L, H) composed of Alice (a) and Bert (b) who agree to co-ordinate their consumption, earnings (Y ) and housework contributions (g) so as to maximise the sum of their utilities. Allowing also for a (possibly negative) side payment s i from Bert to Alice, this household solves the following problem in the absence of taxation:
Denoting household member m's marginal rate of substitution between gross earnings and private consumption by MRS
(subscripts on the utility function denote partial derivatives), the solution to this problem is characterised by the equalities
ductive members. The presence of unproductive members does not affect the analysis, provided this presence influences the preferences of the productive household members in the same way in each household. 4 Put differently, each partner has 'caring' preferences with a 100% degree of caring. Caring preferences invlolve separability, interpersonal utility comparisons and thus cardinalisation (Chen & Wooley, 2001 p 726) . By considering 100% caring, each partner internalises the effects of his/her own actions on the other partner's welfare. 5 One possible solution is where Y ia = Y ib , g ia = g ib , and s i = 0. But then clearly I will now assume that the government would like to raise the living standard of low ability households to the level W L , say. The government cannot observe individual abilities, neither does it observe the amounts of time supplied on the labour market or used for household work, nor the amount of money household members transfer to each other. However, it is aware of the statistical distribution of abilities, and it can observe the gross income (Y ) each citizen earns on the labour market. The revelation principle then says that the government can replicate any redistribution of resources it achieves using an income tax schedule by a direct mechanism where it allocates (net income, gross income)-bundles to citizens upon their announcement of their abilities, provided the mechanism satisfies the appropriate incentive compatibility constraints. 6 To formulate these constraints, it is useful to define a household's semi-indirect utility function, giving for any pair of (net income, gross income)-bundles [(c a , Y a ), (c b , Y b )] the maximal welfare level that household i can achieve, i.e.
The solution to the above problem is characterised by the equalities:
These may also be combined to give MRS ia = MRS ib . Clearly, when the two household members receive the same (net income, gross income)-bundle, these conditions can only be verified if both have the same housework load and no money is transferred between them.
To proceed with the analysis, let me first focus on the case where the two household members go for the same (net income, gross income)-bundle, (c, Y ) say-let me call this uniform labour market behaviour. Under such behaviour,
, and s i = −εw i also constitutes a solution: since both partners have the same market and household productivities, any reallocation of the optimal amount of total factor earnings and total household activity is optimal as well. 6 One could argue that in a society with only intra-class household formation and absence of singles, the tax administration could partially solve the incentive problem by imposing a very high tax liability on any household submitting two different income returns, provided it has reliable records on who forms with whom a household. But there are two objections to this argument. First, as I have argued earlier, the household is not necessarily an a priori verifiable coalition. Second, if by law the individual is considered as the tax unit, the use of non-individual information would fall outside the discretion of the the tax authority. the marginal rate of substitution for a household of type i coincides with the marginal rate of substitution of its members:
I assume that at any (c, Y )-bundle a low ability household will have a larger marginal rate of substitution than a high ability household, i.e. dc dY
. 7 Under uniform labour market behaviour, the incentive compatibility constraint for household i can be written as:
These incentive constraints (which I will refer to as the individual incentive compatibility constraints), together with the single crossing property, imply that both the gross and the net earnings of a high ability individual should be higher than that of a low ability individual: c H > c L and Y H > Y L . Moreover, because the government wants to redistribute from rich to poor, and because it is constrained in this by the budget constraint
should be smaller than 1. If households for some reason only display uniform labour market behaviour, we know from standard income tax theory that it is efficient to distort the bundle intended for the low ability agents to make the mimicking strategy less tempting for high ability households. This bundle is distorted in the sense that the low ability agent's MRS at this bundle is lower than 1, i.e. that (s)he faces a positive marginal income tax rate. 8 On the other hand, because the low ability person will never have an incentive to choose the bundle intended for a high ability agent, the latter should receive an undistorted bundle; that is, a bundle for which his/her MRS equals unity, or still in other words, one for which the implicit marginal tax rate is zero. See e.g. Stiglitz (1982, p 218). 7 In the standard model, normality of consumption (d(
With the presence of the household good, we need in addition that d(
This is e.g. the case when u h`= 0 and u xh ≥ 0. 8 Facing a marginal tax rate t, a person with wage rate w selects a labour supply in accord with the FOC
can thus be interpreted as the implicit marginal tax rate.
3 Non-uniform labour market behaviour and household incentive compatibility
From now on, I shall drop the constraint that members of the same household can only make identical labour market choices. First, consider a household of type H and its indifference curve conditioned on uniform labour market behaviour, dW
. This is drawn as the tin line in figure 1 . Next, consider the indifference curve passing through the same bundle but conditioned on (c H , Y H ) being selected by Bert:
I now claim that when the household good does not affect the marginal willingness to pay for leisure in a too strong way, this second indifference curve is the lower envelope to the first as shown by the bold line in figure 1. This is stated more generally as
Loosely speaking, LE follows from the fact that non-uniform labour market behaviour opens up for Pareto improving side trades: if Alice goes for (c L , Y L ) and Bert for (c H , Y H ), then they not only are on the same welfare level as when both going for (c H , Y H ), but they have also ended up with different marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption; this then opens up for a Pareto improving side trade. This is a loose argument because leisure cannot be traded directly for money, but only indirectly via the household public good whose quantity in turn may affect the preferences for (x,`) bundles. Lemma 2 in the appendix identifies the restrictions on preferences for LE to hold.
When LE does not hold, a household's self-selection constraint under non-uniform labour market behaviour will be slack when the corresponding constraint under uniform labour market behaviour binds. In that case we are back to the standard solution discussed in the previous section. On the other hand, when LE does hold, it is the self-selection constraints under nonuniform labour market behaviour that take over. This will be the subject of analysis in the remainder of the paper.
The redistribution problem of the government may now be formulated as follows:
The first constraint ensures that a low ability household obtains at least the living standard W L . Constraint (λ) is the household incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that a high ability household can never do better by posing as a household with both a high and a low ability member. As I have just argued, if this constraint is verified the individual self-selection constraint will be slack. Thus the set of household incentive compatible allocations is a strict subset of the set of individually incentive compatible allocations. 9 Constraint (γ) rules out that the government runs a deficit. Finally, I mention that the strategy of posing as a household with different abilities is credible in the sense that it pays for each member if it does so for the household. 10 No member will therefore refuse to consider this mimicking strategy.
Performing
and making use of the envelope theorem on problem (1), results in 9 Theorem 1 in the appendix to section 3 shows that a Pareto efficient tax policy that redistributes from H to L is only constrained by the incentive restriction (λ). 10 This is shown formally in Theorem 2 in the appendix to section 3.
the characterisation rules for the marginal tax rate on low and high incomes, respectively:
where
denotes the common marginal rate of substitution (marginal utility of consumption) on which the members of a high ability household settle after they have opted for the package
and have concluded an efficient side trade.
The sign of (4)'s rhs hinges on the difference between two marginal rates of substitution of a high ability person. The rate of substitution in his or her capacity of a member of a household choosing the package
H , and the rate of substitution when the same household goes for the package 
However, it should be clear that if these two indifference curves cross twice, it will be the right crossing that will be part of the optimal allocation. (A small movement of the bundle at the left crossing along L's indifference curve would increase the government budget and weaken the self-selection constraint for the H-household.) compatibility constraint for this household is relaxed by distorting labour earnings of L-households downwards.
We may now combine the two tax formulae to obtain
This expression shows that whenever the distribution of abilities is skewed to the right (µ L > µ H ), the marginal tax rate on low incomes should be lower than the marginal tax rate on high incomes. Notice that because the rhs of (6) is strictly smaller than
, this odds ratio of the ability distribution provides an upper limit on the optimal degree of marginal progressivity. The intuition for marginal progressivity is easy. The benefit of distorting a (net income, gross income)-bundle is to discourage dissembling behaviour. It saves the government from leaving too much information rent with the H-household and is thus proportional with the number of H-people. In contrast, the aggregate cost of a distortion is borne in equilibrium and is proportional to the number of people whose decisions are distorted. Therefore, when there are relatively more low ability citizens, an optimal policy should distort the behaviour of these people less than the behaviour of high ability citizens. I summarise this discussion as Proposition 1 Suppose condition LE holds. In a two-class economy with perfect assortative mating, the marginal tax rate on both low and high incomes is positive at a Pareto efficient allocation. Whenever the distribution of abilities is skewed to the right, the optimal marginal tax rate on high incomes exceeds the marginal tax rate on low incomes.
The case of imperfect assortative mating
A more correct picture of the world recognises the presence of a non-negligible amount of households where the partners' labour market productivities are not aligned (surgeon & nurse, professor & secretary, etc). 12 In this section, I will investigate this case of imperfect assortative mating-some households being formed by one low ability person and one high ability person. I will call such households mixed and denote them by index M . So now the economy consists of f L households of type L, f H households of type H, and
f M = µ H ; and I still assume an ability distribution skewed to the right (µ L > µ H ). For H-households to remain present, f M should belong to [0, 2µ H ); I will refer to such f M values as feasible.
A tax system with the individual as the tax unit should now specify four (c, Y ) bundles. In addition to the bundles (c L , Y L ) and (c H , Y H ), two extra bundles are designed: one for the low ability member of a mixed household ((c Ml , Y Ml )), and one for its high ability member ((c Mh , Y Mh )).
As will soon become clear, the addition of two new bundles boosts the number of self-selection constraints significantly. In order to ease their manipulation, I assume from now on that preferences are quasi-linear in leisure and strongly separable:
. With such preferences, condition LE is satisfied, the total optimal amount of household work is fixed at
) and net household income is shared equally. Thus, a household of type i with abilities w ia and w ib and having chosen the bundles (c a , Y a ) and (c b , Y b ) will in addition to the net utility from the public household good reach a welfare level
I should stress here that though the total amount of household work is fixed to G * , this does not mean that its allocation over the two partners is. In fact, as I will argue below, variability of the individual levels of housework is essential for the partners to rearrange homework such that none of them becomes worse off under any potential mimicking strategy of the household. 
and (c Mh , Y Mh ) just as L, H, Ml, and Mh. Thus, the three family welfare levels in equilibrium are written as:
Family welfare out-of-equilibrium is written in a similar way. For example
is the welfare level that a mixed household would achieve if its low ability member chooses bundle (c L , Y L ) and its high ability member chooses (c H , Y H ).
Notice that for a mixed household, the order in which the two bundles enter the indirect utility function matters (unlike for uniform households). The government evaluates its tax policy by means of a weighted utilitarian social welfare function:
where the weights
The following two conditions impose a sufficient willingness to redistribute from rich to poor families (w aa denotes the arithmetic average of the ability distribution):
R1 is satisfied by equal (utilitarian) weights or any weight vector that is negatively correlated with ability. It implies that (where w ha is the harmonic average of the ability distribution), and R2 satisfied. 14 The government's problem is then to find four bundles L, Ml, Mh and H to maximise SW under the budget constraint
and three sets of self-selection constraints
where i, j ∈ {L, Ml, Mh, H}.
14 Normalising w H to 1, this can be written as
There are in total 33 self-selection constraints: 9 of the first and third type, and 15 of the second type. In the appendix it is shown (lemma 8) that these constraints impose the following ranking on the gross and net income levels:
Furthermore, I prove there (theorem 3) that under these monotonicity constraints and the redistribution assumptions R1 and R2, the optimal policy is constrained by the following three self-selection constraints:
The first incentive constraint is familiar from the perfect assortative mating case; the second and the third are new and involve the mixed household. Later, I will argue that the third need not bind the optimal solution, and that if it does it implies no cost. Let me therefore assume that all three constraints bind the solution. The last two may then also be written as
The advantage of writing the constraints in this way is graphical representation. Expression (10) states that Ml and L should both lie on the indifference curve dW M (·, H) = 0, while according to (11), Mh and H should both lie on dW M (Ml, ·) = 0. In addition, expression (7) (with equality) then reads that bundles L and H should both belong to the conditional indifference curve dW H (·, H) = 0. Three indifference curves thus connect the four bundles-see figure 2 (the dotted indifference curve will be referred to later).
As I mentioned earlier, in order for no household member to get worse off under mimicking (then when being honest), it is required that they reschedule homework (even though the household is equally well off).
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To derive and analyse the optimal solution to the taxation problem, I proceed as Weymark (1986a Weymark ( , 1986b Weymark ( , 1987 and write the income levels in 15 To illustrate the role of household production, consider (7) . Individual utility when the household is honest is given by
For both members to be willing to consider the terms of differences in the utility of consumption. From (7) (with equality), (10) and (11) it follows that 
where the last inequality may also be written as
, it is easy to check that there exists a solution to g a (and thus to g b ) for both members to be willing to consider mimicking, if and
Thus, unless the self-selection constraint (7) holds with equality, the individual rationality constraints cannot be verified simultanously. Since the square bracket term in (IR a ) and (IR b ) is positive, it is clear that under mimicking, a does more than half of the homework (and b less than half).
can in turn be used to express the other three income levels in terms of aggregate consumption and the utility differences, and thus in terms of the four consumption levels:
The original optimal taxation problem is therefore equivalent to the following reduced form problem:
When analysing this taxation problem, I will ignore the monotonicity constraints in the net income levels c i .
The fact that bundle Mh is not part of any mimicking strategy suggests that it should be made available in an undistorted way. This is confirmed by the first order condition w.r.t. c Mh :
For κ ∈ [0, 1), it is clear that a necessary condition for an optimum is that w H v 0 ( c Ml +c Mh 2 ) = 1, or that the marginal tax rate faced by the high ability member of a mixed household is zero. 16 This no-distortion-at-the-top result ties down the value of net income to the mixed household, c Ml + c Mh .
The first order condition for c Ml provides the equilibrium value for the Lagrange multiplier κ:
which is indeed strictly smaller than one, and equal to zero when mixed households are absent. The non-negativity constraint on Y Ml is thus strictly binding. This is not surprising since the low ability member of the mixed household has a comparative advantage in doing the household work and an efficient policy should not make this member participate on the labour market.
The optimal value for c Ml is not unique. For, suppose that (8) is strictly binding. Then we can slightly reduce c Ml and increase c Mh with the same amount. This leaves total net income of the mixed household unaffected, it 16 The marginal tax rate for member a of household i when receiving the bundles
does not change government revenue, and it turns (8) into a strict inequality. Thus the constraints that really limit the redistribution problem are (7) and (9), and nothing is lost by imposing (8) . The optimality conditions for c H and c L are given by
respectively, where
, and
I first comment on (13). The square bracket term on the lhs is the loss in tax revenue from an H-household when c H is lowered marginally and Y H adjusted downwards with w H v 0 (c H ) to keep family welfare constant. The square bracket term on the rhs is positive due to the monotonicity assumption; it measures by how much mimicking becomes more costly for an H-household. This is multiplied by A, the social benefit of inducing self-selection. First, notice that A reduces to µ H (1 − β H w H ) > 0 when f M approaches zero. Thus, with a small fraction of mixed households, the implicit marginal tax rate on Y H is positive as shown for more general preferences in the perfect stratification case. The formula reveals that the argument to distort Y H downwards is augmented by the desire to distribute away from the mixed household (to the extent that β M w H is smaller than one, which it is under R2) but weakened by the non-negativity constraint on Y Ml . (From the expression for Y Ml in appendix 7.2.2., it transpires that it depends heavily on c H .)
Notice that due to R1, a sufficient condition for A to be positive is that
In section 7.2.2 of the appendix, I show that R2 guarantees precisely this. We may therefore conclude that the marginal tax rate on Y H should be positive for any feasible value of f M .
The optimality condition for c L , (14) can be interpreted in a similar way. It balances the budgetary costs with the self-selection benefits of a small reduction in c L .
does not bind the optimal policy (cf theorem 3 in the appendix), the square bracket term on the rhs of (14) is positive:
17 to prevent that a member of 17 Refer to figure 2 and compare the slope of the indifference curve dW L (L, ·) = 0 (the dotted line), with that of the indifference curve dW H (H, ·) = 0 at the bundle L.
an H-household dissembles as L, the L bundle should-on balance-be distorted downwards. But when Y L is reduced, it becomes less costly for an M -household to opt for the package (L, H) and to the extent that the government wants to redistribute away from mixed households (1 >
), this has to be taken into consideration (the second term on the rhs of (14)). As I just argued, the sign of B is positive and thus there is an argument for distorting Y L upwards.
Finally, to derive the graduation in the tax schedule I first solve (13) and (14) for
, and then subtract the latter expression from the former. This yields:
Recall that A and B are positive. Because
, the first square bracket term on the rhs is negative. With an ability distribution skewed to the right (f L > f H ), the entire expression is positive. This means that the marginal tax rate on Y H is larger than the one on Y L for any feasible value of f M .
I now summarise the results on imperfect assortative mating in Proposition 2 Consider a two-class economy with imperfect assortative mating, an ability distribution skewed to the right and social preferences favourable to redistribution form rich to poor (in the sense of R1 and R2). The optimal gross income distribution is then as follows:
• low ability members of a mixed household should not participate on the labour market;
• members of a low ability household should earn a 'low' income level Y L ;
• members of a high ability household should earn a 'high' income Y H ; and , and Figure 3 shows the optimal marginal tax rates when the fraction of mixed households increases from 0 to .49 (for f M ≥ while that on Y L is slightly non-monotonic. The difference between both rates increases the less perfect assortative mating is. Notice that in this experiment, the total endowments in the economy remain the same-only the structure of family composition changes. In figure 4 , I present the family welfare levels, as well as social welfare. Here we observe that less assortative mating increases the welfare of L-and M -households, and up to some extent also that of H-households. This indicates that the self-selection constraint on H-households puts a heavier limit on redistribution policy than that on M -households.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have looked at the tax treatment of households under individual filings and characterised the efficiency properties of an income tax schedule that redistributes from rich to poor households. The fact that tax liabilities are determined on individual incomes, but that the decision to earn these incomes are made at the household level makes this a non-trivial problem. This is because the tax liable members of the same household can side trade leisure for net income with one another, and such side trade opportunities enable them to carry out tax arbitrage. conclusion is that in order to prevent tax arbitrage, the government imposes a positive marginal tax rate on high incomes and sets the marginal tax rate on low incomes below this rate (when the ability distribution is skewed to the right). Then I showed that these conclusions carry over to a society with imperfect assortative mating. The novel feature that is introduced by imperfect assortative mating concerns the income levels and their tax treatment of the members of a mixed household. Low ability members of such a household should be discouraged from participating in the labour market, while the high ability partner should be given incentives to earn a very high income level which is undistorted at the margin, but taxed on average. Let me now come back to some of the assumptions made earlier. I have assumed that both household partners are equally efficient in performing housework and that their contributions are perfectly substitutable. If household members differ in their housework productivities as well, the tax system should take this into account by encouraging the more 'house'-productive members to spend less time on the labour market. With imperfect assortative mating w.r.t. both kinds of abilities, there are ten types of households that may form. The design of an optimal income tax system becomes an intricate problem, the more because the labour market decisions of the household members depend on their comparative advantages, while the taxes and transfers that are based on these decisions should correct for differences in absolute advantages.
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A second feature of the model was that the time spent by one of the partners in producing the household good is perfectly substitutable with the time input of the other partner. I focused on this case to make my argument in the sharpest possible way. But since side trade opportunities are driven by substitutability, it is clear that the smaller the substitutability between the two inputs, the weaker will be the household incentive compatibility constraints. In the case of zero substitution (h = min{g a , g b }), the tax arbitrage problem vanishes.
19 It is not difficult to imagine household goods whose production does not allow substitution: a romantic evening together, for example, is by definition of that kind. Related to this discussion is the issue of observability of the household good. Some goods, are in principle observable. One may for example assume that 'caring for the children' could be observed-or at least that the government could make reasonable guesses about how much of this good is produced (because it knows the number of children and their age). But as long as the contributions of the two productive members of the household are not separately observable, the arbitrage problem remains. It would remain as well when the household produced good was a private rather than public good; all that is needed then is that this good can be shared among the household members.
Side trading opportunities were in this model maximally exploited by the household because its members were committed to cooperation. Without such cooperation some available options to arbitrate will not be made use of and this will make the incentive constraints less binding. In this sense, non-cooperative household members are a blessing for redistribution policy.
In another paper (Schroyen, 1997), I showed that in an economy with two classes (people poorly and wealthy endowed with the numéraire) when side trade in commodities is possible within bilateral coalitions (intra-as well as interclass coalitions), both types of people should face the same marginal commodity tax, but the 'lump sum' part of the tax should be differentiated and a function of the amount traded with the production sector. The reason that we do not get a uniform marginal income tax in the present setting 18 In a recent paper, Balestrino et al (1999) analyse this problem for a society composed of singles (thus avoiding the arbitrage problem).
19 It was observed in footnote 16 that if the household considers the package
, a should perform more than half of the household work in order that b's utility does not drop below the utility he obtains when the household chooses the package
In general, a compensates b by doing more homework.
If a and b are devoted utilitarians, solely concerned with the sum of the two utility levels, tax arbitrage may still occur because it makes available the 'average' bundle (
). I am grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
with imperfect assortative mating, is that interclass side trading is restricted within the institution of the mixed household. Side trade across households is an interesting phenomenon that does take place (low ability persons doing off-the-record housework in the house of high ability spouses). But we are then venturing ourselves on the grounds of tax evasion and 'moonlighting', and should make explicit the audit strategies of the tax administration. In this appendix, I identify the conditions for the LE property to hold (lemma 2), then show that under single-crossing, the LE condition, and redistribution from H to L, only the household incentive compatibility constraint for household H may constrain the optimal policy (theorem 1) and finally demonstrate that if a household is indifferent between two packages, then so are both of its members (theorem 2).
The following notation is used:
denotes the common marginal rate of substitution the two members of a household of type i settle on when one member has applied for the bundle X and the other member has applied for the bundle Y. The incentive compatibility constraints will be referred to as follows:
where HIC stands for household incentive compatibility (under non-uniform labour market behaviour), and IIC stands for individual incentive compatibility (that is, household incentive compatibility, but under the restriction that the two household members must behave identically on the labour market). The proof of theorem 1 is by contradiction and has the following structure. Lemma 4 provides necessary conditions on the relation between average and marginal tax rates for the HIC L -constraint to bind policy. Lemma 5 shows that at a Pareto efficient allocation (PEA), the HIC H -and the HIC L -constraints cannot bind simultaneously. Lemma 6 characterises for a PEA the distortion in bundle L when the HIC L -constraint is binding. Using this result, as well as those in lemma 3, theorem 1 then identifies the HIC H -constraint as the only one binding the PEA when redistribution goes from H to L.
Proof. Follows immediately from the single crossing property.
The next lemma establishes the conditions for the Lower Envelope Condition to hold. When a household where both members have ability w, and both choose (c, Y ) ,it ends up with the welfare level
When partner b of this same household is assigned the bundle (c,Y ), maximal household welfare is given by Proof. The curvatures of the two indifference curves are given by
Since the two indifference curves are tangent at (c,Y ), I thus need to proof
As neither Y b nor c b directly enter a's utility function, they affect a's MRS only through the optimal values for s, g a and g b . The curvature difference then becomes:
where a tilde (~) denotes a compensated effect (e.g. ∂e s/∂Y b = ∂s/∂Y b +∂s/∂c b ·MRS a ).
For the sake of notational ease, but without loss of generality, I assume from now on that the marginal productivity in household production is fixed at unity. The row vector can then be written as:
Total differentiation of the FOCs w.r.t. the household variables gives:
here use has been made of the full symmetry between a and b at the bundle (c,Y ).
Straightforward manipulation then gives:
where the denominator u``+4u hh −4u`h< 0 by concavity. The difference in curvature (times u``+4u hh −4u`h) then becomes:
The conditions under which the rhs is negative thus guarantee LEC. Rearrangement of the rhs gives:
Note that normality of consumption gives 
, the whole expression is negative. In words, a modest effect of the public household good on the marginal willingness to pay for leisure ensures that In particular, this is true when the household good is strongly separable from consumption and leisure. Then u xh = u`h= 0, and the above expression reduces
which is clearly negative. Proof. This follows immediately from the LE condition.
Lemma 4 A necessary condition for the HIC L -restriction to constrain policy is
Proof. Consider the HIC L -restriction as binding. This means that both the
By the second order envelope theorem, this indifference curve is convex w.r.t. the Y-axis-see figure A.1.
Simple inspection of this figure shows that MRS
Lemma 5 At a Pareto efficient allocation, both HIC-constraints cannot be simultaneously binding.
Proof. Theorem 1 Suppose the LE condition holds. At an incentive compatible Pareto efficient income tax policy that redistributes income from H to L, at most the HIC H -constraint will restrict policy.
Proof. By lemma 3, the IIC constraints will never constrain policy, and by 
respectively. By the concavity of the utility function (u xx u``−u 2 x`> 0), the first slope always exceeds (in absolute value) the second. Hence, the two iso marginal utility curves cross only once in the (x b ,`b)-space, namely at (x a ,`a). This means that both partners are equally well off.
Theorem 2 Suppose HIC H is satisfied such that the household is at as well off at (L, H) and (H, H), then so are its members. Moreover, at the package (L, H) a performs more work at home than b such that both end up with the same amount of leisure.
Proof. This follows immediately from lemma 7.
7.2 Appendix to section 4
Results on incentive compatibility
Lemma 8 Incentive compatibility of the allocation implies that the gross and net income levels are ranked as follows:
Proof.
Mh , as well as the three self-selection constraints.
is verified. Then the remaining 29 self-selection constraints are verified as well.
Constraints of the type
, and adding and subtracting
: from 1f), (A3) and that fact that at bundle H the slope of the indifference curve dW L (Ml,
).
(13 in addition to (A2) and (A3)).
(from (A2) and (A3)) and the fact that at bundle Ml, the slope of
and the fact that at bundle L, the slope of dW M (·,
: from 2c), (A3) and the fact that at bundle H, the slope of dW M (H, ·) = 0 (
: from 2d) and the fact that the indifference curve dW M (·, ·) = 0 tangent to dW M (·, H) = 0 at H has more curvature. 
and the fact that at bundle H, the slope of dW H (·, H) = 0 (
(j) Theorem 3 Under redistribution assumptions R1 and R2, the optimal taxation policy solves the reduced form problem (P2) subject to (A1),(A2), and (A3) will not be constrained by
Proof. By lemma 9, a tax policy that is monotonic and satisfies (A1)-(A4)
will be overall incentive compatible. Since the reduced form problem (P2) is obtained from (P1) by imposing (A1)-(A3) and the budget constraint with equality and eliminating all income levels, it remains to show that the solution to (P2) satisfies (A4). The proof goes by contradiction. Suppose that at the optimal policy described by (P2), the constraint
Then it is required that the slope of the indifference curve dW L (L,
) is smaller than the slope of the indifference curve dW H (H, ·) = 0 at the same bundle (
). But this means that the square bracket term on the rhs of the optimality rule for c L (14) is negative, and therefore that 1 w L v 0 (c L ) > 1. Since under R1 and R2 the coefficient A is positive, the optimality rule for c H (13) tells that the slope of the indifference curve dW H (H, ·) = 0 at bundle H ( 1 w L v 0 (c H ) ) is smaller than 1. By convexity of H's preferences, the slope of this indifference curve at L must be even smaller. Since by assumption the indifference curve dW L (L, ·) = 0 is flatter than the indifference curve dW H (H, ·) = 0 at bundle L, the slope of the former indifference curve at that bundle must be smaller than 1. This gives a contradiction. 
. 
,and
Subtracting this second equation from the first and putting the resulting rhs on a common denominator, then gives (15).
The expression (1 − κ−
A sufficient condition for this to hold is that the lhs exceeds the largest feasible
which is condition R2.
